Unaware of the prohibition

Yes. I found 11 other relevant cases in which the defence argued that the person did not know their conduct was prohibited. The outcomes vary: some defendants were acquitted, others remained subject to punishment, and in other cases proceedings were discontinued without punishment even though no mistake excluding liability was established.

Main conclusions

• Simply saying “I did not know” is insufficient. A mistake about a prohibition excludes guilt only if it was unavoidable for the person. If they should have checked whether the act was permissible, the mistake may only mitigate punishment. KarS § 39(1)–(2) and § 60.
• Officials and people acting in a professional capacity are generally held to stricter standards. They must familiarise themselves with the rules of their field. Consulting a lawyer does not automatically help either: what was asked, what answer was given and whether the advice involved substantive analysis all matter.
• Lack of intent and a mistake about a prohibition are different things. Sometimes the knowledge required by a particular offence is not proved. The person may then avoid liability because intent is absent, rather than because of an unavoidable mistake about a prohibition. KarS § 17(1) and (3).
• Discontinuance of proceedings is not an acquittal. An avoidable mistake, together with minor culpability and other circumstances, may justify discontinuance on grounds of expediency.

First, a clarification about the former minister's case

Your description corresponds to Tallinn Circuit Court's judgment of 20 May 2026, 1-25-3370. The charge concerned reimbursement of accommodation rented from the company of the defendant's wife's son: €7453 as a member of the Riigikogu and €5626 as a minister. The county court imposed a suspended prison sentence of one year and four months, but the circuit court acquitted him entirely. For the reimbursement received as a minister, the court considered that the objective elements of fraud were not met: the rules then in force did not clearly exclude reimbursement of rental costs paid to a related person. Relevant paragraphs: 13.1–13.3.

For his conduct as a member of the Riigikogu, the central question was instead whether he knew for certain that his declaration about the absence of a related person was false. The circuit court found that this had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It expressly distinguished assessment of intent from a mistake about a prohibition: the decisive issue was not whether the person should have known the law better, but their actual knowledge. Relevant paragraphs: 15.1–15.3 and 21–24. The acquittal therefore was not simply based on an unavoidable mistake about a prohibition. The judgment became final after the cassation appeal was refused admission. ERR report on the judgment becoming final, 25 August 2026.

I. Cases where a mistake about a prohibition led to acquittal

1. Bringing prescription medicine across the border — acquitted

Supreme Court, 27 September 2022, 1-21-7336, paragraphs 13–24.

A person brought one packet containing 40 phenazepam tablets from Russia to Estonia for personal use, having obtained them on a doctor's prescription. The rules then allowed 30 tablets to be brought in without special permission, making the import of ten tablets unlawful. The person explained that it had not occurred to them that carrying one lawfully purchased packet of medicine might require a separate permit. The county and circuit courts convicted them.

The Supreme Court considered the mistake unavoidable and acquitted the person. The combination of circumstances was decisive: a small quantity, an ordinary prescription, a personal medical need, little danger to public health and no previous experience importing medicines. The court considered that even a reasonable bystander would not easily have thought of the restriction in those circumstances. 30 tablets were returned and ten confiscated. This clearly illustrates how ignorance of a legal restriction can exclude liability in an everyday, low-risk situation.

2. A border-guard operation without permission to simulate an offence — acquitted

Supreme Court, 30 May 2016, 3-1-1-33-16, paragraphs 20–23.

Three border-guard officers organised an operation to apprehend foreigners crossing the border illegally and the person transporting them onwards. During the operation, information about the crossing point and waiting transport was passed to the foreigners. The officers did not know that this required permission to simulate a criminal offence. They were charged, among other things, with unlawful surveillance, and the lower courts convicted them.

The Supreme Court acquitted all three; an unavoidable mistake about a prohibition excluded guilt for unlawful surveillance. The situation was novel in legal practice, and both the prosecution and lower courts had also misinterpreted the activity. If legally trained authorities made that mistake in a retrospective analysis, the same misunderstanding could not be held against officers without legal education who had to decide quickly. It also mattered that the officers had the events under control. This shows that even an official's mistake can exceptionally be unavoidable.

II. Cases where the argument did not prevent conviction or punishment

3. A dean signed a contract with a foundation whose supervisory board he sat on — a €400 fine

Supreme Court, 21 June 2024, 4-23-3193, paragraphs 15–23.

A university dean entered into a cooperation agreement on the university's behalf with a foundation whose supervisory board he also sat on. He believed that the restriction on acts concerned only financial transactions; the cooperation agreement imposed no financial obligations on the university. He had also consulted lawyers about the contract. The county court considered the mistake unavoidable and discontinued the misdemeanour proceedings.

The Supreme Court agreed that the dean genuinely did not understand that the act was prohibited, but found the mistake avoidable. When performing public duties, he should have familiarised himself with the relevant rules. Asking a lawyer for a general assessment of the draft contract was not the same as specifically asking whether he personally could sign it in view of the conflict of interest. The Supreme Court reinstated the €400 fine. This is a particularly useful comparison with the minister's case: credible ignorance does not necessarily mean an absence of liability.

4. A mayor awarded redundancy compensation without the necessary authority — conviction upheld

Supreme Court, 11 December 2013, 3-1-1-92-13, paragraphs 15–17.2.

A mayor made six officials redundant and awarded them a total of €52,030.15 in redundancy compensation, although the structural changes necessary for the redundancies fell within the council's powers. The defence relied, among other things, on a telephone conversation with the city secretary: the mayor supposedly understood that he could dismiss the officials and award compensation himself.

The Supreme Court found that any mistake was not unavoidable. The city secretary had explained that redundancy required a council decision, while leaving by mutual agreement was a different situation. Drawing the desired conclusion from an isolated part of the adviser's explanation did not exclude liability. The sentence for embezzlement remained one year and six months' imprisonment, suspended with a three-year probation period. The mayor was acquitted on another count involving bonus payments, but not because of a mistake about a prohibition.

5. An agency director agreed to a reduced scope of procured work — four months' suspended imprisonment

Supreme Court, 10 October 2014, 3-1-1-46-14, paragraphs 17–18 and the operative part.

The head of a state agency approved an agreement allowing a contractor to provide a two-lane temporary traffic arrangement during roadworks instead of the four-lane arrangement required by the procurement. Payment remained based on the larger scope of work: the courts established an overpayment of €33,668. The defence argued that the director was not a lawyer and relied on the views of agency officials with legal knowledge.

The Supreme Court did not consider this particular mistake unavoidable. The experts' opinions primarily concerned changes to deadlines, rather than allowing less work for the same price. The court acknowledged that a mistake about deadlines might have been unavoidable, but the charge concerned a different agreement. The final sentence remained four months' imprisonment, suspended with a three-year probation period. The lesson is that advice can be relied on only for the question it actually addressed.

6. Unlicensed lending — €2500 for the manager and €300,000 for the company

Supreme Court, 28 November 2022, 1-21-697, paragraphs 60–66 and 81–84.

A company entered into at least 900 consumer-credit agreements over approximately three years without the required licence. The defence argued that the agreements fell within a statutory exception and therefore needed no licence. Nevertheless, the company had repeatedly applied for a licence and communicated with the supervisory authority.

The Supreme Court found that these circumstances confirmed knowledge of the licensing requirement. Even an honest contrary belief would not have made the mistake unavoidable: lending is a specially regulated business, and its requirements must be understood before starting. The board member's €2500 and the company's €300,000 pecuniary punishments were upheld. Confiscation issues were remitted for separate reconsideration. This shows that a favourable legal interpretation of one's business model provides no protection where the actual circumstances indicate awareness of the requirement.

7. A political party borrowed from companies that were not permitted lenders — convicted

Supreme Court, 24 September 2009, 3-1-1-67-09, paragraphs 4 and 10.

A political party received EEK 4,798,000 from companies under loan agreements. The law then permitted parties to borrow from credit institutions, but these lenders were not credit institutions. Board members knew the rules but believed borrowing was permitted because the law did not expressly prohibit borrowing from every other type of company.

The Supreme Court held that defining permitted lenders also excluded other lenders. In case of doubt, advice could have been sought from a lawyer or the competent committee, but it was not. The mistake-about-prohibition argument neither excluded liability nor justified mitigation in that case. The EEK 300,000 pecuniary punishment remained in force: EEK 40,000 was payable immediately, while the remainder was suspended with a three-year probation period.

8. Driving with an expired licence — an EEK 6000 fine upheld

Supreme Court, 13 May 2010, 3-1-1-18-10, paragraphs 7–8.

A driver knew that their driving licence had expired but believed that their right to drive remained. They relied, among other things, on their own interpretation of an earlier court decision. The police imposed an EEK 6000 fine for driving without the right to do so.

The Supreme Court treated this as a mistake about a prohibition: the driver knew the facts but misjudged their legal significance. The mistake was avoidable because the driver had already been prohibited from driving, and there was a dispute about restoration of the right to drive. The earlier decision did not establish that driving was lawful. The fine remained in force. In comparison with the minister's case, the important point is that knowledge of the facts was not absent; the mistake concerned their legal consequences.

III. The argument did not exclude liability, but ultimately no punishment was imposed

9. Ignorance of requirements for handling a small amount of packaging — proceedings discontinued

Supreme Court, 20 April 2011, 3-1-1-29-11, paragraphs 13–15.

A company manager did not know that the packaging arrangements they had organised failed to meet statutory requirements. By agreement with the office building's owner, packaging was taken to the owner's collection container, and the manager believed this was sufficient. The violation concerned approximately 75 kg of cardboard packaging. The company received an EEK 1200 fine, but brought its arrangements into compliance after the inspection.

The Supreme Court found the mistake avoidable: a business regularly handling packaging should know the rules. Nevertheless, ignorance reduced culpability. Considering the small quantity, the actual collection of the packaging and prompt correction of the breach, proceedings were discontinued on grounds of expediency and no fine was imposed. This did not mean that the conduct was lawful or that guilt was absent.

10. A foreigner believed a new residence-permit application allowed continued employment — proceedings discontinued

Supreme Court, 1 November 2013, 3-1-1-91-13, paragraphs 11–16.

A foreigner's residence permit for employment expired. They had applied for a new permit to settle with their spouse and believed they could continue their existing work while the application was processed. The police imposed a €200 fine for working without a legal basis, treating the violation as lasting more than six months.

The Supreme Court found that most of the employment was permitted on other grounds and that unlawful work had lasted only four days. For those four days, the person was mistaken about a prohibition, but could have avoided the mistake by consulting a lawyer. Nevertheless, ignorance together with the very short period of violation made culpability sufficiently minor to discontinue proceedings on grounds of expediency. This cannot be equated with an acquittal.

11. A municipal mayor's “golden handshake” payments — the mistake did not exclude liability, but proceedings ended with an obligation to compensate the loss

Supreme Court, 18 November 2025, 1-23-7274, paragraphs 81–88; the later Harju County Court order is discussed below.

A rural municipality mayor awarded three officials leaving voluntarily compensation equal to six months' salary. Including taxes, this cost the municipality €52,984.80. He considered the payments lawful because he had consulted the municipality's legal adviser and finance director, and similar compensation had been paid before. The lower courts acquitted him on this count, relying, among other grounds, on an unavoidable mistake about a prohibition.

The Supreme Court disagreed that the mistake was unavoidable. A mayor can be expected to know that spending public money requires a legal basis. The assurances from subordinates lacked an identifiable substantive legal analysis and were insufficiently independent. Previous unlawful practice did not justify another payment either. The acquittal was set aside and the count remitted for reconsideration.

On reconsideration, Harju County Court discontinued proceedings by an order of 18 February 2026 on grounds of expediency and required the defendant to compensate the municipality €29,114.88 within three months. It considered, among other matters, the absence of personal gain, law-abiding conduct, acknowledgement of the mistake and acceptance of an obligation to compensate the loss. There was therefore ultimately no conviction, but the reason was not a mistake excluding liability. 1-23-7274, paragraphs 26–32 and 44–48 of the order.

What follows when comparing these cases with the minister's?

The most important question is: what knowledge did the prosecution have to prove?

In the minister's case, the circuit court considered that knowingly providing false information, as required for fraud, had not been proved. In the dean, mayor and lender cases, by contrast, ignorance that the conduct was legally prohibited did not exclude liability. In the medicine-import and border-guard cases, the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional for the mistake to be considered unavoidable.

The case law therefore does not establish a general rule that ignorance of the law excludes liability. What matters is the precise nature of the mistake, the elements of the particular offence and what could reasonably be expected of the person in those circumstances.

The decisive difference was what knowledge the prosecution had to prove. In the minister's case, it was not proved that he knew his declaration was false. The dean knew the relevant facts creating a conflict of interest, but did not know that entering into the contract in those circumstances was prohibited.

The court therefore did not treat the minister's ignorance of the law as an excusable mistake about a prohibition. Instead, the intent required for fraud was missing.

1. The minister: did he know he was providing false information?

In Tallinn Circuit Court's judgment of 20 May 2026, 1-25-3370, paragraphs 15.1–15.3, the central issue was the declaration that the tenancy agreement had not been concluded with a related person within the meaning of the Anti-corruption Act. The minister knew that the company belonged to his wife's son — he did not claim to be unaware of the family relationship. Rather, he said he did not regard his wife's son as a related person in the statutory sense and therefore believed his declaration was true.

Fraud requires proof of knowingly creating a false impression. On the circuit court's interpretation, the prosecution therefore had to prove that the applicant knew for certain that his declaration was incorrect. A conclusion that he should have read or known the law could not replace proof that he actually knew it. KarS § 209(1) and § 16(3).

The court considered it possible that his mistaken understanding had developed through completing declarations of interests. His legal education, previous offices and anti-corruption training did not, in the court's view, eliminate all doubt about his actual knowledge. This was not a finding that his carelessness was acceptable, but that carelessness was insufficient to prove intentional fraud. The outcome was a full acquittal. 1-25-3370, paragraphs 21–24.

There was also an independent ground for acquittal concerning the €5626 received as a minister: the reimbursement rules then in force did not clearly exclude reimbursement for accommodation rented from a related person. For that part, the court considered that even the objective elements of fraud were absent. The issue of knowledge was therefore particularly important for the €7453 received as a member of the Riigikogu. 1-25-3370, paragraphs 13.2–13.3.

2. The dean: he knew of the conflict of interest but considered the transaction permissible

In the Supreme Court's judgment of 21 June 2024, 4-23-3193, paragraphs 15–18, the dean knew he was entering into a contract on the university's behalf with a foundation whose supervisory board he also sat on. The Supreme Court explained that intent to breach a restriction on acts requires knowledge of the facts creating the conflict of interest, rather than necessarily knowing that the law prohibits the act. The disputed issue was his belief that a contract imposing no financial obligations was permissible. The applicable provisions were the then-current KVS § 19 and § 11(1)(1).

The Supreme Court also believed the dean's statement that he did not understand that his conduct was prohibited. The difference was not that the minister was believed and the dean was not. However, the court classified the dean's ignorance as a mistake about a prohibition, which excludes liability only if the mistake was unavoidable. KarS § 39(1).

The court considered the mistake avoidable because the dean:

• should have familiarised himself with the restrictions on acts when performing public duties;
• had himself expressed doubts about his two roles;
• asked a lawyer for a general assessment of the contract, rather than specifically asking whether he personally could sign it;
• failed to resolve his doubts even though the legal adviser opposed entering into the contract.

The €400 fine therefore remained in force. 4-23-3193, paragraphs 19–23.

3. Why can this distinction nevertheless seem inconsistent?

It is not simply a matter of “the minister was mistaken about facts, while the dean was mistaken about the law”. Both knew their actual relationships and misunderstood the legal rules. The decisive legal step in the minister's judgment was to treat his misunderstanding of the concept of a related person as a lack of knowledge that his declaration was false, rather than merely ignorance of the prohibition on his conduct. The circuit court expressly explained this in paragraph 15.1. 1-25-3370, paragraph 15.1.

Furthermore, both cases required direct intent — the dean's case did not merely have a lower threshold for intent. What differed was the object of that intent:

• In the minister's case: did he know he was declaring something false?
• In the dean's case: did he know the facts creating the conflict of interest? If so, the court then separately assessed whether his ignorance of the prohibition was unavoidable.

The minister therefore did not have a lesser duty to know the law. In the court's view, a breach of that duty could not replace proof of the specific knowledge required for the offence. This explains the different outcomes, but does not make the distinction between the two types of mistake beyond dispute.