Publishing a conversation

Taking part in a conversation does not automatically give you the right to publish it online. Publication may be permitted with the other person's consent or another sufficient legal justification. Without either, publishing an identifiable person's private conversation is risky, even if the screenshot or recording is entirely authentic.

What should you check before posting?

The following basic rules emerge from the case law.

• Agreeing to a conversation or recording does not mean consenting to publication online. Consent must cover the particular publication intended, and the publisher must be able to prove that consent exists. General Data Protection Regulation, Article 4(11), Article 6(1)(a) and Article 7.
• Covering the name may not be enough. A person may be identifiable from their profile picture, voice, username, workplace or the circumstances of the conversation. Their opinions and answers may also constitute personal data. Tallinn Circuit Court judgment of 18 March 2026, 3-24-2146, paragraph 15.
• Using a conversation as evidence and posting it publicly are different acts. Submitting a conversation to a competent authority to protect your rights may be justified even where making that same conversation visible to everyone is not. Supreme Court judgment of 6 June 2019, 3-17-842, paragraphs 20–26.
• Publication without consent is not always prohibited, but it needs a specific legal basis. For example, relying on a legitimate interest requires assessing whether publication is necessary and balancing the competing rights. Publication for journalistic purposes requires a public interest, compliance with journalistic ethics and no excessive harm to the person. Mere curiosity or a desire to shame someone is not sufficient justification. GDPR Article 6(1)(f); Personal Data Protection Act, § 4.
• Publishing a truthful conversation can still infringe privacy. A selective excerpt or an added accusation can also make a post misleading or defamatory. Law of Obligations Act, § 1046(1–2) and § 1047(1–3).
• Be particularly careful with health, sex life and other sensitive data. Additional restrictions apply to processing these data; an ordinary legitimate interest alone is insufficient. GDPR Article 9(1–2).

In practice: if your aim is simply to describe your experience, it is generally less risky to summarise it in your own words, remove information about bystanders and avoid making the other participant identifiable. If your aim is to prove threats, bullying or another violation, preserve the complete original and prefer submitting it to the authority handling the matter over posting it publicly.

Ten relevant court cases

Below, I distinguish judgments directly concerning publication of conversations from supporting cases about privacy and reputation. Older cases applied the data protection law in force at the time: their principles matter, but whether a publication is lawful today must be checked against current law.

1. Publishing your own telephone conversation on social media

A member of parliament published a recording of a telephone conversation with a public official on their social media account. The official had refused permission to publish it. More than 33,000 people saw the video, it was shared 944 times, and publication was followed by derogatory comments about the official. On 18 March 2026, Tallinn Circuit Court upheld the judgment dismissing the publisher's challenge to a Data Protection Inspectorate order. The order required the publisher to refrain from republishing the video containing personal data or to remove those data. 3-24-2146, paragraphs 1–3 and 14–20; Tallinn Administrative Court judgment of 9 January 2025, paragraph 13.

This is the most direct answer to your question: publishing one's own call was not permitted simply because the publisher had participated in it or wanted to criticise the official's work. The absence of an objection to recording the call did not amount to consent to publication. The court emphasised that the substance of the conversation could have been shared with the public without the official's personal data. 3-24-2146, paragraphs 15, 19–20.

2. Recording and forwarding a conversation to prove workplace bullying

A public official secretly recorded a performance appraisal and forwarded it to the director general and an internal control official to prove alleged workplace bullying. The official was dismissed from service partly for breaching personal data protection requirements. On 6 June 2019, the Supreme Court declared the dismissal unlawful and ordered the agency to pay lost salary and compensation equal to three months' average salary; the agency had to calculate the euro amounts. The court also awarded €750 in legal costs. 3-17-842, operative part, points 2–8.

The court attached importance to the actual need to prove workplace bullying, which tends to be concealed, and to the fact that the recording was sent only to people investigating the complaint. The Supreme Court expressly stated that the outcome could be different if the recording were published to an indefinite audience. A right to submit a conversation as evidence therefore cannot be equated with a right to put it on the internet. 3-17-842, paragraphs 19–26.

3. Publishing statements from a conversation after permission was withdrawn

A person who had given an interview later prohibited the use of their name and the content of the conversation, but the author nevertheless published them in a book. On 29 March 2017, the Supreme Court partly overturned the dismissal of the claims and remitted the case for reconsideration. On reconsideration, the Circuit Court awarded €1,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage on 25 August 2017. A claim for disgorgement of €1,750 in income was dismissed because it had not been proved that the defendant had earned income from the infringement. 3-2-1-153-16, paragraphs 22–26; 2-15-94, paragraphs 45–58.

What mattered was that publication breached data protection requirements: obtaining compensation did not additionally require proof that all quotations were fabricated or defamatory. An authentic quotation is not the same as permission to publish it. For literary publication today, the exception in § 5 of the Personal Data Protection Act must also be considered separately; it likewise does not allow excessive harm to a person's rights. 2-15-94, paragraphs 54–56; Personal Data Protection Act, § 5.

4. Showing a conversation with the police without the person's consent

Television news showed a driver and their conversation with a police officer during a traffic check. The car had been stopped because a dipped headlight was not working; the driver had refused to be filmed. On 13 January 2010, the Supreme Court held that general interest in the police operation did not justify showing this particular person in an identifiable way. On reconsideration, 10,000 kroons, equivalent to €639.12, was awarded in compensation on 27 April 2010. 3-2-1-152-09, paragraphs 11–14; 2-07-46108, operative part.

This judgment shows that even a conversation in a public place cannot be published without limits. The court pointed to the possibility of making the person technically unrecognisable, but stressed that the context must not enable their identification either. The same consideration applies to a screenshot: hiding only the name may not be enough. 3-2-1-152-09, paragraphs 13–14.

5. Publishing family information shared by a former partner

A media outlet published articles about the private life of a well-known creative professional and their child while the parents were involved in a custody dispute. The child's father had consented to publication, but the other parent had prohibited it. On 26 June 2013, the Supreme Court upheld compensation of €2,500 for each injured party, €5,000 in total. 3-2-1-18-13, operative part and paragraphs 15–17.

The court explained that being well known and having previously discussed one's private life do not mean giving up privacy. Public interest cannot be equated with curiosity, and children's private lives require heightened protection. If your conversation concerns the other participant's child, partner or other people as well as the participant, you must also take those people's rights into account. 3-2-1-18-13, paragraphs 14–17.

6. Criticism based on screenshots from a chat group

A blogger published a post about an influencers' chat group that coordinated reciprocal likes and comments. The post named the group's administrator and criticised the artificial inflation of popularity through this activity. On 4 October 2021, Tartu Circuit Court dismissed the claims for damages and retraction and ordered the claimant to pay €6,898.08 in procedural costs. 2-19-18645, operative part and paragraphs 12–14.

The screenshots confirmed the group's purpose and the claimant's role, so the critical assessments were justified. Public criticism of activity connected with a conversation may be permitted when it has a true factual basis. However, the judgment focused on protection of reputation and does not provide general permission to publish all personal data from every private conversation. 2-19-18645, paragraphs 12–14.

7. Someone who shares another person's text is also responsible for publication

A person shared another author's press release on social media. It criticised a lawyer's demand letters and associated them with circumstances suggesting extortion. On 18 May 2022, the Supreme Court remitted the case for reconsideration. In a later Circuit Court judgment of 13 September 2024, the claim for compensation was dismissed: the criticism was considered permissible in the context of public debate. The claimant was ordered to pay €10,047.44 in procedural costs. 2-20-12495, paragraphs 10–13; 2-20-12495, operative part and paragraphs 18–19.6.

The Supreme Court's important principle was that a republisher is also a publisher: saying “I only shared it” does not exclude responsibility. At the same time, not every negative assessment is unlawful; its basis, wording and context are decisive. When posting a conversation, you are therefore also responsible for the statements you redistribute and the accusations you add. 2-20-12495, paragraph 11; 2-20-12495, paragraphs 18–19.6.

8. Information already made public cannot be republished without limits

A person serving a life sentence sought €5,000 in compensation over a television programme, challenging, among other things, the publication of their name, image, living quarters and a video of an investigative procedure. On 18 February 2015, the Supreme Court set aside the Circuit Court judgment and remitted the case for reconsideration because the different acts of publication had not been assessed separately. This Supreme Court judgment did not determine a final compensation award. 3-2-1-159-14, operative part and paragraphs 12–16.

The court recognised the public interest in a serious crime, but stressed that data disclosed during public court proceedings cannot therefore be republished without limits. A new publication expands the readership or audience and may increase the intrusion into private life. Another person's earlier post, or a conversation they published themselves, likewise does not automatically entitle you to distribute it in a new context. 3-2-1-159-14, paragraphs 14–15.

9. Even emails sent to a small group of recipients can infringe rights

A person sent emails to third parties containing insults and a false factual statement about a former partner. On 6 January 2023, Tallinn Circuit Court upheld €300 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and prohibited further use of specific insulting expressions in emails sent to third parties. A second claimant's monetary claim was dismissed, although the assessment published about that person was also found unlawful. 2-20-8437, paragraphs 40–43.

Statements about the first person were sent to around ten recipients, while those about the second were sent to a single acquaintance; the difference in circulation affected whether compensation was justified. An infringement of rights does not necessarily require a public internet post. A limited audience sometimes reduces the seriousness of an infringement, but does not by itself make insults or false statements permissible. 2-20-8437, paragraphs 41.2 and 42.3–43.6.

10. Recording your own call does not give you an unlimited right to distribute it

A hunting association expelled five members on several grounds. One member was accused of secretly recording a telephone conversation with a board member and emailing it to the other members. On 6 January 2022, Tallinn Circuit Court upheld the invalidation of the expulsion decision and ordered the association to pay €806.39 in appeal costs. 2-20-13551, operative part and paragraphs 61–62.

The court considered recording to avoid a situation of one person's word against another's understandable in everyday terms, but noted that recording without notification may conflict with the principle of good faith. Distributing the recording was not a sufficiently serious reason to expel the member in this case. This was not a general ruling that public distribution of the recording was lawful: the dispute concerned whether expulsion from membership was justified, not an unlimited right to publish online. 2-20-13551, paragraph 62.

Recommendation for your situation

If this is an identifiable person's ordinary private conversation and you have neither their consent to publication nor a specific, compelling justification, do not post it unchanged. Prefer an anonymous summary or use the conversation only as necessary evidence.

Unlawful publication may result in demands to remove the post, refrain from further publication, correct false statements and pay damages. Law of Obligations Act, § 1055(1), § 1047(4) and § 134(2), (5–6).